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Abstract Empathy is usually conceived of as independent of
the non-verbal behaviors which mediate its experience,
though embodied cognition theory predicts that individual
differences in action representation will affect empathic traits.
The “Actions and Feelings Questionnaire” (AFQ) was de-
signed to capture individual differences in self-awareness of
own and others’ actions, particularly those associated with
feelings, which we predicted would correlate with levels of
empathic traits. A pilot 30-item questionnaire included items
on perceptual sensitivity to action, imitation, action imagery,
and gestural and facial expression. It was completed by a
sample of 278 adults (mean age 21.2 years; 189 females, 89
males) along with the 15-item Empathic Quotient (EQ)
Questionnaire. Total scores on the final 18-item questionnaire
showed strong internal coherence (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81)
and test-retest reliability (ICC=0.88), marked effect of sex and
highly significant correlation with EQ. The questionnaire was
administered to participants in an fMRI study investigating the
neural correlates of facial imitation. Total AFQ score correlat-
ed with activity in somatosensory cortex, insula, anterior
cingulate, and visual cortex. The AFQ shows promise as a
brief and simple self-report measure sensitive to variability
in the self-awareness of actions associated with feelings. It
suggests that much of the variability of empathic traits in typical
populations is accounted for by variance in this capacity. We
suggest that beingmore empathic really is about being “touchy-
feely,” and this questionnaire provides a novel measure of
action-based empathy.
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Introduction
Nonverbal communication is critical to social functioning. It
includes the regulation of eye contact, facial expression of
emotion, and use of gesture. Intact social communicative abil-
ities and in particular, the communication of emotion, require
skills in expression and also sensitivity to their enactment by
others. Impairments of nonverbal communication are a core
feature of the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder
and assessments of these abilities are key features of diagnos-
tic instruments such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule and the Autism Diagnostic Interview (Lord et al.,
2000; Rutter, Le Couteur, & Lord, 2000). The importance of
nonverbal communication has been recognized in its making
up of two constructs within the RDoC strategy (Morris &
Cuthbert, 2012); http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-
priorities/rdoc/rdoc-constructs.shtml#production_nonfacial_
communication). Nevertheless, paradigms for its research
remain at early stages of development, perhaps because of
the complex challenges concerned with the measurement of
behaviors which have multiple degrees of freedom.
Because nonverbal behavior is so important for the com-
munication of emotion between individuals, a question of par-
ticular interest is how nonverbal behavior relates to empathy.
According to Decety (2011), the “term empathy is applied to
various phenomena which cover a broad spectrum, ranging
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from feelings of concern for other people that create a moti-
vation to help them, experiencing emotions that match another
individual’s emotions, knowing what the other is thinking or
feeling, to blurring the line between self and other.” De
Vignemont and Singer (2006) describe empathy as a process
whereby another person’s affective state evokes an isomor-
phic emotional state in the observer of which he or she is
aware. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) define it as a
capacity to understand other people’s feelings and to respond
to them appropriately. A distinction between the first two and
the last definition is that empathy is defined either as being
primarily dependent upon one individual evoking a feeling
state in the other, or alternatively it relies on an individual
“understanding” the other and responding appropriately.
Notably, all these definitions define empathy as a phenome-
non at an experiential level, and only Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright include an element whereby empathy is evi-
denced by enactment rather than what they report thinking
or feeling, though even then it suggests a reliance on judgment
rather than through their expression of empathy in the form on
non-verbal behavior.
Embodied (or Grounded, Barsalou, 2008) theories of cog-
nition (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, &
Ric, 2005) view the processes of knowledge use and acquisi-
tion as fundamentally grounded in their physical context and
the brain’s modality-specific systems. This means that those
cognitive operations that are heavily influenced by both action
plans and emotional states are highly dependent upon those
aspects of the brain that serve action plans and emotional
states. With respect to empathy, grounded cognition theory
argues that its cognitive computational mechanisms are
grounded in the sensorimotor mechanisms that mediate its
perception and expression. Hence, empathic function depends
upon the capacity to “feel” the emotion, so implicating a crit-
ical and additional role for the somatosensory cortex
(Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Damasio &
Carvalho, 2013; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). The role
of the human mirror neuron system (hMNS), in empathy has
been central to this debate (e.g. Bastiaansen et al., 2009;
Decety, 2011; Gallese et al. 2004; Iacoboni & Dapretto,
2006). By serving to encode both the perception and expres-
sion of action used to communicate emotion, the hMNS (in
humans this usually refers to premotor cortex and intra-
parietal sulcus) potentially provides the foundation for em-
pathic function. Zaki, Hennigan, Weber, and Ochsner (2010)
suggest that the hMNS is engaged in empathic tasks when
non-verbal social cues are involved. A review of some 200
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies (Van
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009) found that the hMNS is engaged
during perception and execution of articulated motions of
body parts. They argued that this confirms the matching role
of the mirror system in understanding biological action, and
therefore, by implication, the actions of others. Some studies
have associated neural activity or grey matter volume in the
hMNS with empathic traits (Braadbaart, de Grauw, Perrett,
Waiter, & Williams, 2014; Cheng et al., 2009; Pfeifer,
Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008; Lamm, Nusbaum,
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007; Schulte-Ruther, Markowitsch,
Fink, & Piefke, 2007).
However, despite the appeal of this theory, most evidence
has not provided support for a key role for systems serving
action-representation in empathic function. Studies of empath-
ic function during fMRI, and consequent meta-analyses of
these studies (Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011;
Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011) consistently relate empathy
to activity of the anterior cingulate and insula, and evidence
that action representation is involved has been somewhat lack-
ing (Decety, 2011). A possible reason for this is the way that
empathy is defined and conceptualized for the purpose of
these meta-analyses. Empathy as defined by De Vignemont
and Singer (see above) might also be termed “emotional con-
tagion” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993). Consequently,
the emotions communicated are conceptualized as distinct
from the actions which communicate them, rather than “em-
bodied,” and experimental designs control for amount of ac-
tion content. Most fMRI studies of empathy compare the in-
fluence of an action communicating an emotion or pain, with
an action communicating something “neutral.” However, be-
cause the activity levels of brain areas serving action represen-
tation (whether at a somatosensory or programming level) are
not influenced by the degree or type of emotion, it does not
necessarily follow that they aren’t critical to the mechanisms
for its transmission (Grèzes, Wicker, Berthoz, & de Gelder,
2009).
Empathy has also been defined as a capacity to understand
other people’s feelings and to respond to them appropriately
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Hence, attribution of
motive or understanding (cognitive perspective-taking) is es-
sential, for which purpose studies variously refer to false-
belief tasks, metarepresentation, “theory-of-mind,” or inferen-
tial understanding. These studies implicate the temporo-
parietal junction and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Zaki &
Ochsner, 2012). Again, this perspective defines empathy as
a cognitive process functioning independently of action
representation.
Interestingly, those studies which have implicated the
hMNS in empathy have associated it with individual differ-
ences in empathic traits rather than associating MNS activity
with an empathic experimental condition. For example, both
Braadbaart et al. (2014) and Pfeifer et al. (2008) found that
activity in the MNS during facial imitation correlated with
levels of empathic traits. Similarly, differences have been
found in activity of the MNS between participants with and
without autism spectrum disorder during an empathic task
(Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti,
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2009). With further respect to autism, the clinical literature
finds that impaired empathic and nonverbal communication
are closely related, insofar as they are both strongly asso-
ciated with the diagnosis. Given increasing acceptance of
the idea that autism might reflect a dimensional construct
(e.g., Constantino & Todd, 2003), with traits being con-
tinuously distributed throughout typical populations, it
follows that a similar relationship might exist in typical
populations. Whilst mechanisms serving the perception and
expression of action in social communication may not be
specific to empathic function, individual differences in
sensorimotor function may still be an important factor
contributing to variability in expression of empathic traits
in typical populations. Furthermore, variability in empathic
traits may contribute to the development and maintenance
of certain relevant sensorimotor functions.
Jackson and Decety (2004) refer to “motor cognition;” the
fundamental unit of this paradigm being action, defined as
“movements produced to satisfy an intention towards a spe-
cific goal, or in reaction to a meaningful event in the physical
and social environments.” Motor cognition includes the pro-
cesses involved in the perception, recognition, and interpreta-
tion of action as well as the processes concerned with action
preparation and production. This would include those process-
es based in insula and somatosensory cortex serving the inter-
oceptive representation of action-associated feelings. The
question may therefore be posed as to what extent variability
between individuals in levels of empathic traits is associated
with variability inmotor cognition within socioemotional con-
texts. And to what extent might dysfunction of mechanisms
serving the perception and enactment of social actions occur
in mental health problems such as schizophrenia and autism?
On the perceptual side, the evidence points to only weak as-
sociations between reduced levels empathic traits and reduced
capacity to identify emotions both in typical and clinical
groups ( Dalton et al., 2005; Hadjikhani et al., 2004; Klin,
Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Law Smith,
Montagne, Perrett, Gill, & Gallagher, 2010; Williams,
Nicolson, Clephan, de Grauw, & Perrett, 2013), and indeed
perception of emotional distress may even be enhanced in
autism (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit,
2007). Stronger evidence points to an important role of atten-
tion in determining the degree to which people with reduced
empathy, such as those with autism or amygdala lesions, will
attend to other’s actions (Dalton et al., 2005; Hadjikhani et al.,
2004; Klin et al., 2002; Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar,
2003). With respect to the production of action, clinical stud-
ies of autism show that the expression of emotion and thought
in action through gesture, eye movements, directed facial ex-
pression and modulated speech are strongly diagnostic (Lord
et al., 2000; Rutter et al., 2000).
Nevertheless, the relationship between the production of
non-verbal expression and empathy appears to be little
studied, not least because of the difficulties of examining this
in an fMRI environment. But there are also few tools available
for examining individual differences in non-verbal expression
in a purely behavioral context. For example, we would postu-
late that individuals who use a lot of gesture would also show
a lot of facial expression, and would be more empathic, but we
are not aware of any empirical evidence for this in the general
population, or tools available for its study.
We considered that a self-report measure of motor cogni-
tion might constitute a simple initial step that could capture
individual differences. More specifically, we considered that
aspects of motor cognition concerned with the representation
of actions communicating feeling states, would constitute an
important aspect of empathy. We therefore sought to develop
such a measure, and to test the hypothesis that (a) different
aspects of motor cognition serving the communication of feel-
ings (e.g., gesture, imagery, imitation) loaded onto a single
construct, and (b) they correlated with empathic traits. If a
single construct existed, we could examine possible neural
substrates with participants who had recently taken part in
study involving fMRI of facial imitation (Braadbaart et al.,
2014).
Study 1
Methods
The study was approved by the University of Aberdeen Ethics
Review Board for the College of Life Sciences and Medicine.
A self-report questionnaire was devised that attempted to
gauge people’s views on how much they imagined actions,
read other people’s behavior, imitated other people, were sus-
ceptible to emotional contagion, and expressed thoughts and
feelings through gesture, facial expression, and body posture.
We wished to make the overall purpose of the questionnaire
relatively opaque so as to minimize acquiescence bias. In do-
ing this, we sought to make the questions quite neutral and
also included questions that were marked negatively, though
this was difficult without making questions sound awkward or
convoluted. In the end, nine questions out of 30 were nega-
tively scored. We called it the “Actions and Feelings
Questionnaire” (AFQ), again to give it a neutral tone.
Participants were asked to respond to the choices of “strongly
agree,” “slightly agree,” “slightly disagree,” and “strongly
disagree.” For positively scored questions, 3, 2, 1, or 0 points
were given, respectively, in response to the statement “please
tick the box that most applies to your view of yourself.” For
negative questions, scoring was in the opposite direction.
A version of the questionnaire was first sent to a conve-
nience sample of ten friends and colleagues to get some initial
feedback about readability and ambiguity. The questionnaire
was then modified according to suggestions and comments. It
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was then posted using an on-line survey instrument (Survey
Monkey). Links to the survey were distributed by word of
mouth, and through on-line social networks (Facebook) in-
cluding the research group’s page. There were no exclusion
criteria. The 30 questions that formed the AFQ were followed
by 15 questions derived by Muncer and Ling (2006) from the
Empathic Quotient Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2004) to make a short version. These were
scored using the same options, but scoring followed a 2, 1,
0, 0 pattern as employed by the authors of that questionnaire.
In addition, questions were included at the beginning to ask
about sex, year of birth, occupation (seven choices were giv-
en: “student,” “in employment or seeking employment,”
“housework,” “retired,” “seeking work,” “retired,” or “oth-
er”), whether English was the first language, and country of
residence. A statement was made to the effect that entrants
should be over the age of 18 years. About 7 weeks after the
original questionnaire was posted, an e-mail was sent to those
participants who had provided their addresses to be sent fur-
ther versions of the questionnaire. This email contained the
link to the second version of the questionnaire. The second
version was exactly the same as the first but the initial demo-
graphic questions and EQ questions at the end were omitted.
Statistical analysis
The internal consistency of the AFQ was examined to gauge
the extent to which items in the total scale give consistent
responses. Two methods of measurement were applied:
Cronbach’s alpha and item-total correlations. Conventionally,
alphas between 0.7 and 0.9 and item-total correlations ≥0.3 are
considered indicators of adequate internal consistency
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). As such, in this preliminary
form of the scale, items with corrected item-total correlations
≥0.3 were retained in the questionnaire. Subsequent analyses
were based on the scale constituting the retained items.
In order to identify the most appropriate number of factors
to explain the pattern of co-variation in the variables of the
AFQ, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was computed. A
polychoric correlation was selected, as is appropriate where
the distribution of ordinal items is skewed. An oblique rotation
was selected, allowing for correlation between factors. The
parallel analysis (PA) procedure of Horn was followed to de-
termine the number of factors to retain (Horn, 1965), applying
the optimal implementation of Timmerman and Lorenzo-Seva
(2011). The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) and ac-
companying confidence intervals (CIs) were computed to ex-
press the between pair variance as a proportion of the total
variance in the AFQ total score. The ICC varies between the
values of 0 and 1 where 0 indicates no agreement and 1 indi-
cates perfect agreement.
For each participant, a total AFQ score was calculated, as
well as total scores for emerging factors. In view of the
characteristics of the sample (see below), we investigated the
effects of age, sex, and occupation on total and sub-total
scores by dividing the group into two, and comparing the
sub-groups with independent t-tests (male vs. female, student
vs. other, and young vs. old – split according tomedian value).
Age was also assessed with the rank correlation. Relationships
with EQ were assessed using Pearson correlation coefficients.
Assessment of internal consistency, retest reliability, and
convergent validity were assessed using SPSS Version 21.
Parallel analysis was conducted using the FACTOR program
(Davis, 1980; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Lorenzo-Seva &
Ferrando, 2013).
Results
Participants
Of 318 registered entries to the questionnaire 278 valid re-
sponses were obtained. The remainder were inadequately
completed. There were many more female compared to male
respondents (189 females, 89 males; approximately a 2:1 ra-
tio) but representation of males was almost exactly the same in
older and younger age groups (32 % vs. 31.5 %). The popu-
lation was also heavily biased towards a younger population
and 119 (42.8 %) respondents reported themselves to be stu-
dents. Those in employment or self-employed made up most
of the remainder (144; 51.8 %) who described themselves as
seeking work (n=3), engaged in housework (n=8), retired
(n=10), and other (n=3). Only 12 (4.3 %) respondents did
not continue school after minimum school age and 30
(10.8 %) participants said that English was not their first lan-
guage. The younger population (n=128) had a mean year of
birth of 1992 (age 21.2 years; SD 1.64; median 1993) whilst
the older population (n=149) had a mean year of birth of 1969
(age 44 years; SD 11.7; median 1970). There was one missing
value for age. The country of residence was the UK for 90 %
of participants. The remainder came from elsewhere in Europe
(n=17, 6 %) or North America (n=7), whilst one each came
from Australia and Japan.
Questionnaire properties
Internal consistency
Eighteen items had corrected item-total correlations ≥0.3 and
were therefore retained to form the Final AFQ (see Table 1 for
items). Reasons for low correlations for the 12 discarded items
are unclear but could be because they were more sensitive to
variance in attentional abilities, or because they asked about
behaviors and experiences upon which people found it hard to
reliably report. Internal consistency for the final questionnaire
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was robust with Cronbach’s alpha=0.81. All subsequent anal-
yses were confined to these 18 items.
Exploratory factor analysis
Item data were complete for 256 individuals. This number is
sufficient for a reliable factor analysis and it is unlikely that a
larger sample size would alter the analysis (MacCallum,
Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). Parallel analysis identified
a two-factor structure as giving the best explanation of the
pattern co-variation. The first factor was composed of nine
i t ems and exp l a i n e d 23 . 8 % o f t h e v a r i a n c e
(Eigenvalue=4.29). The second factor was also composed of
nine items and explained a further 10.7 % of the variance
(Eigenvalue = 1.92). Table 1 shows the factor loadings on
each item for the two factors. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.75 for
the first subscale and 0.73 for the second.
Examination of the items contributing to the two factors
showed that the items in the first factor were those that referred
to production of action, and so we referred to this as the “pro-
duction” sub-scale (e.g., “music that I like makes me want to
dance to it” or “acting things out helps me to understand
them”). Those in the second factor pertained to how people
reported their experience of perceiving others’ actions (e.g., “I
tend to pick up on people’s body language” or “when I re-
member what someone said to me, I often recall the look on
their face”). We called this the “perception” sub-scale.
Test re-test reliability
Of 154 participants who consented to be sent the second ver-
sion, 78 replies were received. Of these e-mail addresses did
not correspond for four cases and two further cases did not
provide valid AFQ scores. Therefore, Test-Retest data were
available for 72 individuals. The ICC of the AFQ total score at
the two time points was 0.88 (95 % CI=0.79 to 0.93) demon-
strating acceptable retest reliability (see Fig. 1).
Individual differences and actions and feelings questionnaire
scores
The sum total scores and separate factors followed normal
distribution curves (see Figs. 1 and 2). Overall the mean total
score was 38.14 (n=257, SD=7.92) and sub-scale means were
20.5 (n=265, SD=4.63) and 16.7 (n=267; SD=4.45) for pro-
duction and perception, respectively. Production and percep-
tion factor scores correlated with each other: r = 0.446,
p<0.001. Measures for sub-groups are shown in Tables 2
and 3. These showed significant sex differences for total score
and sub-scale scores, with a large effect size of >0.6 (Cohen’s
d) similar to that found for the EQ (Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004). There was no significant difference be-
tween students and non-students. There was no correlation
between total score and age (Spearman r = −0.037, p=0.552).
Robust correlations were found between the total EQ score,
total AFQ score and between EQ and the two sub-scale scores
(Total AFQ vs EQ: r= 0.615, n=257, p<0.0001; Production vs
EQ: r=0.689, n=240, p<0.0001; Perception vs EQ: r=0.347,
n=247, p<0.0001; see Fig. 2). As the correlation between
Production and EQ was stronger than that between EQ and
both the total score and Production, we ran a linear regression
to examine the relative contribution of the two sub-scales to
the relationship. This showed that after controlling for the
Production score, the correlation between Perception and EQ
Table 1 Factor loadings* of the 18 item AFQ
Item Production Perception
1. I tend to pick up on people’s body language
2. To understand someone I rely on his or her words rather than their expression or gesture§
3. To make sense of what someone else is doing, I might copy his or her actions
4. Music that I like makes me want to dance
5. In my mind's eye, I often see myself doing things
6. If talking on the phone, I am sensitive to someone's feelings by the tone of their voice
7. If others are dancing I want to join in
8. My body movements do not tend to reflect the way I feel§
9. I often imagine myself performing common actions
10. I would consider myself to be a "touchy-feely" person
11. When I recall what someone said to me, I have to think hard to remember their facial expression at the time§
12. I rely on seeing how a person looks me in the eye to gauge what they really feel
13. I wouldn't tend to know what someone was feeling like if they did not say§
14. I move my hands a lot when I speak
15. I get animated when I am enthusiastic in conversation
16. I can easily bring to mind the look on someone's face when I remember telling them something
17. Acting things out helps me to understand them
18. Watching someone's body language is not a good way to judge their feelings§
−0.139
0.139
0.518
0.681
0.377
−0.035
0.646
0.220
0.299
0.263
0.044
0.303
−0.094
0.340
0.399
0.021
0.557
0.148
0.578
0.362
−0.057
−0.100
0.269
0.486
−0.010
0.279
0.190
0.348
0.631
0.284
0.502
0.128
0.233
0.640
0.029
0.265
*Factor loadings >0.3 are shown in bold; § Reverse scored items
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was non-significant (Production: Standardized Beta=0.673,
t=12.93, p<0.0001,Beta 95 % CI=0.71–0.96; Perception:
Standardized Beta=0.051, t=0.98,p=0.33, Beta 95 %
CI=−0.07–0.20)
Discussion (study 1)
We sought to design a self-report measure that would capture
individual differences in experiences of cognitive reliance on
action. Our results suggest that we achieved this aim. Our final
questionnaire consisting of 18 items, demonstrated highly sat-
isfactory internal consistency and rate-rerate reliability. Total
scores were uninfluenced by age or occupation, but showed a
marked effect of sex, with an effect-size of a very similar
magnitude, and in the same direction, to that found with the
EQ questionnaire (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).
Scores were also uninfluenced by whether English was a
first language providing an indicator that they are not highly
dependent upon language skills. We also found a robust cor-
relation with the 15-item EQ, suggesting that both question-
naires tap into common underlying traits.
Of further interest were the two factors that emerged from
the exploratory factor analysis. The first factor,which we have
called “Production,” was loaded with items that asked about
the expression of thought and feelings through action, or
imagining acting-out. The second factor was loaded with
items that asked about perceptions and memories of other’s
actions (especially others’ expressions of emotions) and so we
have called this “Perception.”Whilst both factors and the total
score all correlated with the EQ score, the correlation of
“Perception” with EQ was weaker and became non-
significant after controlling for “Production.” Similarly, the
effect of sex for “Perception” was weaker than that for the
“Production” factor. If the association between AFQ and EQ
scores was simply mediated by a tendency to rate one’s self as
more sociable, emotionally sensitive or reactive, we would
have expected the opposite, since five out of six items that
used the words “feel,” “feelings,” or “feely” loaded more onto
the Perception factor.
As mentioned in the introduction, the EQ is thought to
be driven by quite a “cognitive” definition of empathy –
relying on a capacity to understand others feelings and
make appropriate judgments as to how to respond to
them. This raises the question as to whether “perception”
and “production” factors could relate differentially to
“affective” and “cognitive” aspects of empathy. Further
work might explore the relationship between the AFQ
and the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ), which
is designed to tap into more emotional aspects of empa-
thy (Spreng, McKinnon, Mar, & Levine, 2009), in which
case we may predict these associations to be reversed.
However, we note that in a large study of the EQ, evi-
dence was not found for separate cognitive and affective
components of empathy (Allison, Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Stone, & Muncer, 2011). Furthermore, the
EQ correlates highly with the TEQ (r=0.8, n=65; Spreng
et al., 2009). Therefore, it remains unclear as to whether
cognitive and emotional empathic traits can be discerned
from one another as separate sources of individual dif-
ferences. In addition, in our questionnaire those items
which one would have been predicted to tap more onto
an “affective” or “emotional contagion” factor (such as
“music I like makes me want to dance”), actually loaded
more heavily on to the “production” factor. We note that
the two-factor model derived from this study still re-
quires confirmation and the model therefore still requires
assessment in further samples using confirmatory factor
analysis.
One pertinent observation is that the AFQ concerns
itself with self-report of personal experience, and there-
fore with the degree to which individuals are self-aware
of both perceived and enacted action. It is therefore pos-
sible that it reflects levels of action-awareness more than
actual dependence on nonverbal cognition. We anticipat-
ed that study 2 might throw some light on this
Fig. 1 Scatterplot showing evidence for test retest reliability
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hypothesis and to help to explain the relationship be-
tween our measure and empathy.
Study 2
Background
We recently conducted a study investigating the neural corre-
lates of facial imitation accuracy (Braadbaart et al., 2014), in
which volunteers were asked to imitate a range of facial ex-
pressions. The expressions were created by morphing basic
emotional expressions in varying amounts, to create arrays in
which many expressions were closely similar to one another,
thus creating an imitation task which required participants to
copy emotion-conveying expressions that were as accurate as
possible. The task differs from other facial imitation tasks in
placing high demands on the capacity for control over the
facial expression of emotion. We have repeatedly found that
performance on the task correlates with empathic quotient
(Braadbaart et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2013). In the
fMRI study, we compared activity during the imitation task
with a control condition, where participants executed a
predetermined facial action according to instruction. EQ
correlated with the level of activity during imitation relative
to that during response to instruction in intraparietal sulcus,
dorsal premotor cortex, somatosensory cortex, and hippocam-
pus, providing evidence that greater activity of sensorimotor
systems during imitation is associated with higher levels of
empathic traits.We hypothesized that the relationship between
AFQ score and EQ might also be mediated by common
reliance on these regions.
Methods
A more detailed description of the Facial imitation task and
fMRI study can be found in Williams et al. (2013) and
Braadbaart et al. (2014). Twenty right-handed participants
(ten female) between 19 and 45 years old were asked to lie
in a 3 T MRI-scanner (Achieva X-series, Philips Medical,
Best, The Netherlands) with a 32-channel phased-array head
coil (technical parameters in Braadbaart et al., 2014). After
initial structural scans, the fMRI study consisted of just two
conditions. Participants were shown manipulated male and
female face stimuli showing expressions of the six basic emo-
tions, either pure or blended in variable amounts. A letter
above the screen provided instruction: an “I” indicated a re-
quirement to Imitate, an “O" to form an “O” with the mouth,
and a “T” to stick out the tongue. This control condition was
referred to as an execution Mismatch as the same expressions
were shown for both “Imitate” and “Mismatch.” Performance
was monitored using a camera mounted to the head coil. After
pre-processing the data, we investigated differences in activa-
tion between Imitate and Mismatch.
For the purposes of this study, permission was sought from
the local ethics committee to trace participants and invite them
to complete the AFQ. Of the original 20 participants, valid
Fig. 2 Scatterplots showing correlations between Total Actions and
Feelings Questionnaire (AFQ) and factor scores with Empathic Quotient
(EQ) total
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responses were obtained from 12 participants (mean age:
25.9 years [SD=5.52], six females). From the replies, total
AFQ score and scores for the two factors were calculated
and we tested for correlations first with the other behavioral
measures of performance, and then with the difference in
BOLD response between Imitate and Mismatch using SPM.
Threshold for statistical significance was determined at a clus-
ter level of 38 voxels at p<.001, derived from Monte Carlo
simulations (Forman et al., 1995; Slotnick, Moo, Segal, &
Hart, 2003).
Results
Results are shown in Table 4 and Fig. 3. We found no signif-
icant correlations between EQ and either total score or the two
subscale scores (unsurprising given the small sample size).
Looking at the fMRI data, we found significant positive cor-
relations between total AFQ and activity during Imitation
compared to Mismatch in the sensorimotor cortex, insula,
and anterior cingulate, and the visual cortex. The subscales
showed broadly similar relationships but the Production factor
also correlated with caudate activity. All three scales also
showed negative correlations with activity in the Fusiform
gyrus.
Discussion
The results of this analysis revealed a relationship between
AFQ total score and activity in the network of somatosensory
cortex, insula, and anterior cingulate during imitation com-
pared to an instruction condition. As discussed above, whilst
there is widespread acceptance for the role of anterior cingu-
late and insula in empathy, the role of somatosensory cortex is
less clear. fMRI studies suggest that the somatosensory cortex
serves a role for vicarious perception of touch but not emotion
(Keysers et al., 2010; Molenberghs, Cunnington, &
Mattingley, 2012; Zaki et al., 2010). In a meta-analysis,
Lamm et al. (2011), found that the insula and anterior cingu-
late were consistently associated with empathy, but that the
somatosensory cortex was involved non-specifically, and only
when strong visual cues were involved.
However, Straube and Miltner (2011) carried out a study in
which they parametrically increased the degree to which par-
ticipants were required to attend to the emotional content of
the stimuli and their own reaction. Attention to emotional
content and own experience was associated specifically with
increasing activity in somatosensory cortex and posterior
insula. Straube and Miltner suggest that somatosensory cortex
may be important for attending to own feelings and inferring
emotional intensity from that experience. Earlier work has
Table 2 Sex differences between measures
Sex N Mean SD t df p Mean Difference Cohen’s d
Sum 18 item AFQ M 83 34.61 7.63 −5.17 255 <0.0001 −5.20 −0.69
F 174 39.82 7.51
Sum Production M 87 18.24 4.94 −4.61 148* <0.0001 2.84 0.62
F 178 21.08 4.17
Sum Perception M 85 15.39 4.13 −3.25 265 0.001 −1.87 −0.43
F 182 17.26 4.48
Sum EQ M 84 15.04 5.70 −5.17 251 <0.0001 −3.78 −0.68
F 169 18.82 5.37
*Levene's test for unequal variance significant (p<0.04); equal variance not assumed.
Table 3 Mean group measures for age and occupation
English 1st Language N Mean SD Age N Mean SD Student N Mean SD
Sum 18 Item Yes 229 37.96 7.72 Younger 133 38.56 7.66 Yes 114 38.19 7.99
No 28 39.57 9.37 Older 123 37.58 8.14 No 143 38.09 7.88
Sum Production Yes 236 20.05 4.56 Younger 138 20.42 4.54 Yes 117 20.15 4.65
No 29 20.93 5.18 Older 126 19.80 4.71 No 148 20.14 4.63
Sum Perception Yes 238 16.58 4.37 Younger 141 16.54 4.29 Yes 116 17.00 4.55
No 29 17.31 5.15 Older 125 16.75 4.63 No 151 16.40 4.38
Sum EQ Yes 224 17.34 5.72 Younger 133 18.28* 5.40 Yes 112 17.35 5.87
No 29 19.28 5.85 Older 119 16.71* 6.05 No 141 17.73 5.68
All t-tests NS but for: *T=2.17(df=250), p=0.031
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also implicated the somatosensory cortex in mediating
attention-to-action (Rushworth, Krams, & Passingham,
2001). In two other studies, somatosensory cortex activation
was associated with emotion appraisal during an empathic
task (Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007) and with
judgment about an action in a perspective-taking task (Lamm,
Fischer, & Decety, 2007). Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper,
and Damasio (2000) found that impaired recognition of facial
emotion followed lesions to somatosensory cortex and
Pitcher, Garrido, Walsh, and Duchaine (2008) found that
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to somatosensory
cortex disrupted emotion recognition. These authors suggest
that somatosensory cortex is involved in the recognition of
emotion by simulation of feeling states that correspond to
those perceived. In this study, in the contrast between
imitation and the control condition, it was precisely such a
simulation function that was being contrasted.
Furthermore, Picher et al. (2008) also found that TMS to
the lingual gyrus disrupted emotional recognition. The corre-
lations that we also found in visual cortex could therefore
possibly reflect the role of this region in emotional simulation,
but could also reflect a difference in the amount that partici-
pants were looking at the facial stimuli in the two conditions.
In the imitation condition, participants were required to look
carefully at the face in order to imitate it accurately. In the
instruction condition, the facial stimuli were the same but
played no meaningful role in the task. Therefore, it may be
that the correlations stem from differential amounts of
attention being paid to the faces in the two conditions
and, therefore, that the AFQ is predicting the differential
amount of attention being paid to the face for the purpose
of imitation compared to when just the instruction was
followed. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is also
thought to play a role in mediating attention to faces
(Wang, Ramsey, & Hamilton, 2011; Wolf, Philippi,
Motzkin, Baskaya, & Koenigs, 2014). Together therefore,
the pattern of activity in this analysis suggests that the
AFQ score might correlate with activity that reflects the
degree to which participants attended to the facial stimuli
and also their own responses to them during an imitation
Table 4 Brain areas where contrast of activity between Imitation and Mismatch conditions correlated significantly with AFQ Total score and factor
scores (statistical threshold determined at a cluster level of 38 voxels at p<.001, derived from Monte Carlo simulations)
Location Cluster Size T Z-score X Y Z
Total Score (positive) Lingual 129 9.6 4.73 24 −72 −10
Lingual 319 9.04 4.61 −22 −76 0
Occipital 348 7.88 4.35 16 −84 22
Anterior cingulate 124 7.1 4.15 10 38 16
Somatosensory 125 6.97 4.11 −52 −24 22
Postcentral gyrus 85 6.92 4.1 −34 −24 46
Somatosensory 41 6.1 3.85 28 −10 30
Insula 38 5.39 3.61 36 −14 18
Total score (negative) Fusiform 77 7.5 4.26 42 −36 −18
Cerebellum 66 5.68 3.71 8 −34 −20
Precentral 64 5.47 3.64 28 −20 56
Factor 1 (positive) Lingual 87 7.24 4.19 −8 −64 −6
Caudate 131 6.99 4.12 −26 0 24
Postcentral 108 6.85 4.08 −36 −16 44
Angular 89 6.64 4.02 −34 −70 36
Insula 40 6.03 3.83 36 −12 18
Cuneus 169 5.7 3.72 10 −80 38
Factor 1 (negative) Fusiform 91 9.26 4.66 42 −36 −20
Factor 2 (positive) Lingual 55 7.42 4.24 12 −76 −6
Lingual 150 6.54 3.99 −16 −80 −4
Operculum/supramarginal 41 6.44 3.96 −50 −24 20
Postcentral 48 6.3 3.92 −60 2 22
Factor 2 (negative) Inferior frontal 86 10.07 4.81 48 22 10
fusiform 52 6.27 3.91 44 −34 −16
precentral 49 6.16 3.87 28 −18 54
mid temporal 43 5.74 3.73 −64 −40 10
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task. The negative correlation with activity in the face
fusiform area might be explained if looking to imitate
emotional expressions somehow disengaged other face
processing in fusiform face area.
General discussion
Our first study hypothesized that a common construct would
underpin a range of self-reported socioemotional behaviors
that were all reliant on the perception, imagination, or produc-
tion of action, and furthermore that a measure on this construct
would correlate with self-reported empathy. Our first study
revealed evidence for a coherent construct that had good
test-retest reliability, indicating that the measure reflected nor-
mally distributed, between-individual variation that remained
stable over a period of about 7 weeks. Also, the construct
correlated well with EQ. On reflection, we considered that
because the questionnaire asked participants to report on their
experience, it may provide a measure of self-awareness of
action.
It might be suggested that the correlation between EQ and
AFQ arose because the content of the questionnaires overlaps.
However, the emphasis of the EQ is on social understanding,
judgment, motivation, and reactivity to expressions of
emotions, whilst in contrast, the AFQ asks respondents to
report self-awareness of their own and other people’s actions.
Some overlap may occur where EQ questions are concerned
with awareness of other’s behavior, or some AFQ items ask
about emotional reactivity when referring to awareness of
others. This seems insufficient on its own to account for the
correlation which suggests a stronger association between the
constructs.
In itself, a strong correlation between self-report levels
of non-verbal behavior and self-report of empathic traits is
significant. Much research has drawn a distinction be-
tween mechanisms serving action representation and in-
ferential reasoning (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012), or been
concerned with identifying neural substrate specific to
empathy which does not include brain areas serving ac-
tion-programming. However, this does not preclude the
possibility that individual differences in mechanisms serv-
ing action representation are not important for generating
variability of expression of empathic traits in the popula-
tion as a whole. Our finding suggests that this is indeed
the case, though because we note that this is a self-report
measure, it may to some degree reflect a capacity for
introspection and self-awareness. Therefore, our behavior-
al findings suggest that self-awareness of feelings
expressed in actions is an important component of
Fig. 3 Slices demonstrating locations of significant correlation between Total Actions and Feelings Questionnaire (AFQ) score and contrast of imitation
vs. instruction in the (A) insula, (B) anterior cingulate, and (C) somatosensory cortex as described in Table 2
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2016) 16:248–260 257
empathy. Self-awareness of actions relies on a capacity
form a “secondary” representation of action that is distinct
from the primary coding of that action in either perceptual
or motoric modalities (Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001) and
this is likely to be necessary for both perspective-taking
(Lamm et al., 2007) and differentiation between self and
other (Decety 2011)
The fMRI analysis informed the findings of the ques-
tionnaire study. The rationale behind this hypothesis was
that the facial imitation task we employed was designed to
elicit carefully controlled enactment of socioemotional be-
havior, and would therefore place high demands on those
brain mechanisms utilized for the perception and enact-
ment of emotional expression. We expected that this task
would be sensitive to individual differences in activity of
cognitive mechanisms mediating the representation of so-
cial actions. The total score correlated with activity in the
circuit consisting of anterior cingulate, somatosensory
cortex, and insula, but also visual cortex, was consistent
with activity reflecting attention-to-action and action-
awareness.
These findings appear to be in accord with the behavioral
findings. They suggest that variability in the distribution of
empathic traits within typical populations is heavily influ-
enced by the capacity to attend to one’s own internal repre-
sentations of actions associatedwith feelings. Presumably, this
capacity is critical to the self-awareness of one’s own feeling
states, which in itself is critical for empathy. Not only do we
see a strong correlation in this capacity with EQ but also
marked sex differences.
However, this does beg the question of why we found a
stronger association between EQ and questions that concerned
themselves with the production rather than the perception of
action. As mentioned one possibility is that both the “produc-
tion” factor and the EQ are oriented more towards “cognitive”
aspects of empathy, but the question remains as to why they
should be related. One possible explanation is provided by the
Enactive Mind (EM) framework (Klin et al., 2003) which
seeks to “highlight the central role of motivational predispo-
sitions to respond to social stimuli and a developmental pro-
cess in which social cognition results from social
action”(p.348). Within this framework, the focus is on the
mechanisms by which individuals engage in the processes of
acquiring social competences in the first place. A mechanism
that fosters attention to relevant action-cues for the purpose of
enacting appropriate responses is central to the development
of social cognition, and an inclination to attend to action
would develop into higher levels of action-awareness, which
is then detected as a trait measure by our Actions and Feelings
Questionnaire. In our fMRI study, AFQ score appears to be
correlated with the effects of extra attention being paid to the
face when extra attention was required to complete the task as
well as possible, as well as activity within the empathic
network driving attentional differences. According the EM
framework, in the context of this fMRI study, the AFQ total
score is providing a measure of the degree to which attentional
mechanisms are adapted to attend to action for the purpose of
imitating it. In the broader context, this would suggest that the
degree to which attention mechanisms are adapted to attend to
action-cues can be measured using the AFQ and that this
measure is associated with levels of empathic traits.
Our stronger correlation between EQ and the production
subscale as opposed to the perception subscale is consistent
with the EM framework, in that the former subscale reflects
not just attention to others’ actions, but attention to others’
action for the purpose of enactment (as also occurred during
the facial imitation task). Therefore, it appears to be the ca-
pacity of the system to attend to those action-cues that are
relevant to own intentions that determines an association with
both empathic traits and AFQ.
As noted we found marked sex differences in our question-
naire comparable to those seenwith the EQ. This generates the
hypothesis that there will be sex differences in a capacity to
attend to relevant action-cues. Whilst we are not aware of
research specifically identifying sex differences in attention-
to-action, there is evidence that women show a higher degree
of emotional awareness than men (Barrett, Lane, Sechrest, &
Schwartz, 2000). The presence of sex differences therefore
add further support to the suggestion that this questionnaire
taps into individual differences in self-awareness.
One limitation of the questionnaire study is that the sample
was not representative of a typical human population, being
largely British, and involving disproportionate numbers of
females, students, and young people. Our initial findings do
not suggest that age or background has a significant effect on
score, but these require confirmation with a more representa-
tive sample. Also, we have only explored the association be-
tween scores on this questionnaire and a single measure of
empathic traits. In future research it will be of interest to ex-
plore associations with other measures of empathic function
and emotional awareness. Clearly, the correlational study
employing the fMRI data is based on small numbers and re-
quires replication with a larger sample.
In summary, in an initial study with this novel self-
report questionnaire, we found evidence for a coherent
and reliable measure of action-awareness that corresponds
to individual differences in empathic traits, reveals marked
effects of sex and suggests that mechanisms controlling
attention to action and self-awareness of action may be
an important source of individual differences in empathy.
We suggest that a capacity or willingness to attend to one’s
own internal representations of actions which serve feeling
states, constitutes an important source of variability in the
expression of empathic traits in typical populations. It is a
commonly held belief that “touchy-feely” types of people
are more empathic. Our research suggests that this might
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be a particularly apt term. We note the comment made by
Decety (2011) that the construct of empathy “may be too
complex to be both meaningful and useful for sound re-
search in affective and social neuroscience,” and that
breaking it down into component processes will be bene-
ficial in the exploration of psychiatric disorders or abnor-
mal empathy. The AFQ may promise to be a useful tool in
this endeavor by targeting a specific aspect of empathic
functioning, i.e. bodily awareness and expression, that
is critical to social behavior and disrupted in a range of
mental health problems.
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